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State Department review completed

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

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The Situation in Vietnam

State Department
review completed.

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Information as of 1600
5 July 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

US Marines operating near Con Thien and immediately below the Demilitarized Zone have suffered heavy casualties in the past four days in a series of contacts with the enemy and there are indications that more Communist attacks are imminent.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
More enemy attacks in the DMZ area of northernmost Quang Tri Province may be imminent (Paras. 1-5). A NVA prisoner states troop movements into South Vietnam were heavy during March, April, and May (Paras. 6-9). Weekly review of South Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 10).

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
V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

VI. Other Major Aspects: Laotian leaders continue to exhibit considerable sensitivity to the possible presence of US or South Vietnamese troops in Laos in connection with the proposed anti-infiltration barrier (Paras. 1-2).

NOTE: Graphics of Weekly South Vietnam Battle Statistics will be published tomorrow.

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The contacts with the enemy which began on 1 July near Con Thien are now reported to have cost the US Marine elements involved 106 killed, 290 wounded, and 5 missing. Included are Marine losses of 15 killed and 51 wounded on 4 July in enemy mortar attacks immediately below the Demilitarized Zone. The enemy body count is now 223 for the four days of action.

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3. In addition, the continued artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks on Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha this week attest to the continued presence of one or two artillery regiments. The capability to support infantry units south of the DMZ with artillery located within and north of the zone and the short supply line from North Vietnam, make this area especially advantageous to the Communists.

4. On 3 July, two Marine battalion landing teams were airlifted to reinforce the six Marine battalions now conducting Operation CIMARRON in the area immediately below the DMZ.

5. The Communists made their traditional propaganda claims following the Con Thien battle. On 4 July, Radio Hanoi announced that three companies of Marines had been "wiped out" and two others "heavily decimated." The broadcast also claimed that US commanders intentionally ordered air strikes to kill some 40 Americans who had been captured.

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Communist Movements of Men and Materiel Into
Kontum Province

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6. A North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldier captured [redacted] of Kontum Province, stated during interrogation that 2,000 replacement troops a month moved into South Vietnam during the three-month period from March to May this year. The prisoner claimed that his unit was working near Communist Base Area 609 in Laos when the troop movements were observed.

7. The Communist troops were reportedly part of an effort intended to reinforce understrength NVA units in South Vietnam in preparation for the monsoon offensive. According to the captive, one group was scheduled for the B-3 Front and the remaining two were to provide replacements to main force units in Communist War Zones "C" and "D."

8. In addition to the troop movements, the prisoner stated that an average of ten trucks loaded with 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortar rounds, small-arms ammunition, and other supplies were seen nightly.

9. Although this area has been a known supply and infiltration point, the claimed number of NVA troops may have been exaggerated. The remoteness of the established base camp areas and the security provided by the Communist-controlled portions of Laos makes this route advantageous to the enemy. Once within South Vietnam, the men and materiel are moved over trails to the coastal flatlands as well as to the southern areas.

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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

10. The week of 25 June - 1 July compared with the week of 18-24 June:

I. Viet Cong Incidents

	<u>18-24 June</u>	<u>25 June-1 July</u>
Attacks	33	33
Battalion or Larger.....	0	0
Small Unit.....	48	33
Harassment	308	240
Terrorism	35	37
Sabotage	12	23
Propaganda	4	16
Antiaircraft	<u>268</u>	<u>239</u>
TOTAL INCIDENTS	660	588

II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>18-24 June</u>	<u>25 June-1 July</u>	<u>18-24 June</u>	<u>25 June-1 July</u>
Killed	1,905	1,331	119	144
Wounded	-----	-----	330	466
Missing/ Captured	-----	-----	<u>39</u>	<u>28</u>
TOTALS	1,905	1,331	488	638

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>18-24 June</u>	<u>25 June-1 July</u>	<u>18-24 June</u>	<u>25 June-1 July</u>
Killed	273	161	15	15
Wounded	1,258	1,529	25	5
Missing/ Captured	-----	-----	--	--
TOTALS	1,531	1,690	40	20

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III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>18-24 June</u>	<u>25 June-1 July</u>	<u>18-24 June</u>	<u>25 June-1 July</u>
Individual	369	Not	105	108
Crew-Served	<u>50</u>	Reported	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	419		105	108

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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VI. OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

1. Laotian leaders are continuing to exhibit considerable sensitivity to the possible presence of South Vietnamese or US troops in Laos in connection with the proposed anti-infiltration barrier. In recent discussions with GVN leaders in South Vietnam, Laotian Chief of Staff Oudone Sananikone and his deputy Kouprasith Abhay replied to a GVN offer of assistance in expanding Laotian Government control into Pathet Lao - held areas of the panhandle by limiting such help to "money, arms, and possibly training." Oudone reportedly emphasized that "Vietnamese" assistance should not include putting South Vietnamese or US troops into the Laotian panhandle.

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